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"MILTON, Fla. Three months after the local police inspected more
than a dozen businesses searching for illegal immigrants using stolen
Social Security numbers, this community in the Florida Panhandle has
become more law-abiding, emptier and whiter. Many of the Hispanic
immigrants who came in 2004 to help rebuild after Hurricane Ivan have
eitherfled or gone into hiding. Churches with services in Spanish are halfempty. Businesses are struggling to find workers. And for Hispanic
citizens with roots here-theforemen and entrepreneurswho received visits
from the police-the losses are especiallyprofound.,,
I. Introduction
Florida is just one state out of many that is enacting stronger and
harsher laws aimed at preventing illegal alien employment.2 A new law in
Mississippi makes it a felony for an illegal alien to hold a job.3 A law in
Oklahoma also makes it a felony to shelter or transport illegal aliens.4 In
2008, a staggering 1,305 or more pieces of state legislation related to
immigration issues had been introduced.5 In 2007, an astounding 1,562 bills
1.

Damien Cave, Local Officials Adopt New, HarderTactics on IllegalImmigration,

N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at Al.
2. See id, ("State lawmakers, in response to Congressional inaction on immigration
law, are giving local authorities a wider berth. In 2007, 1,562 bills related to illegal
immigration were introduced nationwide and 240 were enacted in 46 states, triple the
number that passed in 2006, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.").
Of these bills, the majority do not relate to employment issues, but a substantial percentage
do.
3. See Mississippi Employment Protection Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(8)(c)(i)
(2008) ("It shall be a felony for any person to accept or perform employment for
compensation knowing or in reckless disregard that the person is an unauthorized alien with
respect to employment during the period which the unauthorized employment occurred.").
4. See Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, §
446(2007) (making it a felony to knowingly "transport, move.., conceal, harbor or shelter"
any illegal immigrant).
5. See DmK HEGEN, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS
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related to immigration were introduced, and 240 laws were enacted.6 The
top three areas of these pieces of immigration related legislation in 2007
and 2008 were identification/driver's licenses, employment, and law
enforcement.7 Preventing illegal alien employment thus is at the forefront
of many states' immigration issues, and will likely remain so in the future.
A. Legislative Standard
Immigration analysts point to the alleged lack of Congressional action
on illegal aliens as a reason for many states' passing so many immigration
related bills.8 But what standard, if any, has Congress provided relating to
the employment of illegal alien workers, and to illegal aliens in general?
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) mandates
sanctions for knowingly hiring illegal aliens. 9 The IRCA "forcefully made
combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of
immigration law."10 The IRCA prohibits the employment of aliens who are
not lawfully present in the United States, and not lawfully authorized to
work in the United States." In order to prevent the employment of
unauthorized workers, the IRCA requires employers to verify the identity
and eligibility for work of all new hires.' 2 This verification is accomplished
RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION IN 2008 1 (2009) available at http:l/www.
("In the 2008 state
ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/immig/StatelmmigReportFinal2008.pdf
legislative sessions, no fewer than 1305 pieces of legislation related to immigrants and
immigration had been introduced.").
6. See id. at 1 ("The 2008 level of activity is comparable to last year, when 1,562
bills were introduced and 240 laws were enacted.").
7. See id. ("As in recent years, the top three areas of interest are
identification/driver's licenses, employment and law enforcement.").
8. See Cave, supra note 1 (quoting Jessica Vaughan, a senior policy analyst at the
Center for Immigration Studies, who describes the recent increase in state illegal
immigration laws due to Congressional inaction).
9. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (1986)
("It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for fee, for
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien... with
respect to such employment... ."). The Act further imposed sanctions for any violations
under section (a)(1). Id. § 1324a(a)(4) ("With respect to a violation of subsection (a)(1)(A)
or (a)(2) of this section, the order under this subsection shall require the person or entity to
cease and desist from such violations and to pay a civil penalty in an amount of .... ).
10. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(describing the effect the IRCA had on Immigration Law in general).
11. See generally Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, supra note 9.
12. Id.
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with the employer's review of specified documents. 3 Under the IRCA, if
an employer knows that an employee's status is unauthorized, the employer
must discharge the employee.' 4 If the employer fails to do so, the employer
will be subject to both civil fines and criminal prosecution. 5
Other notable immigration related acts include the Immigration Act of
1990, which increased legal immigration ceilings and tripled the number of
visas for priority workers and professionals with U.S. job offers.' 6 The
1996 Illegal Immigration Act made immigrants eligible for deportation
proceedings for minor offenses such as shoplifting, instead of only for7
offenses that carried a potential sentence of five years or more in jail.'
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Form Act, passed in 2002,
provided for more Border Patrol agents, required that schools report foreign
students attending classes, and stipulated that foreign nationals in the
United States will be required to carry IDs with biometric technology.' 8
Finally, in 2005, Congress passed the Real ID Act requiring the use of IDs
meeting certain security specifications to enter government buildings, board
planes, and open bank accounts. 19
B. Overview
It is evident in analyzing these major immigration statutes that
Congress has acted in many ways relating to immigration in whole, but had
provided only a general standard, enunciated in IRCA as pertaining to
hiring illegal aliens: "It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to
recruit or refer for fee, for employment in the United States an alien
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.,, 20 The first main question this
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1990).
17. See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 2009-546.
18. See generally Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543.
19. See generally Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
20. See Immigration Reform and Control Act, supra note 9, at § 1324a(a)(1) ("It is
unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for fee, for employment in
the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien ...with respect to such
employment ....).
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Note will address in Section II is how to assess the constitutionality of
recent and controversial state immigration employment laws, such as that
enacted in Mississippi. After this assessment is made, this Note will apply
the constitutional analysis formulated in Section II to the Mississippi
Employment Protection Act2 1 in Section III. The legislative standard
enunciated in ActIRCA does little to guide us in assessing the
constitutionality of recent state immigration employment bills, and
therefore the analysis will predominantly rely on the relevant case law
governing immigrant and illegal alien employment.
The next portion of this Note (Section IV) will attempt to provide
insight on whether these new state laws pertaining to illegal alien
employment have, or will likely, help the state's economy regardless of the
laws' constitutionality. This section of the Note will analyze several
economic reports on the effect illegal aliens have on the economy, and will
draw conclusions based on these reports whether state laws seeking to curb
illegal alien employment aid the state's economy.
C. ImmigrationLaw Terminology
The terminology related to immigration law can be confusing due to
the media's common misuse of standard immigration terms. For example,
what is the difference between an alien and an immigrant? Furthermore,
what is the difference between an illegal alien and a non-immigrant?
Understanding these distinctions and other immigration law-related
terminology is a necessary starting point and will greatly help in
understanding the relevant legislative standard and case law governing an
illegal alien's right to employment. The media's contortion of common
immigration law-related terms also makes it important to gain a real
understanding of the terminology.
The United States Internal Revenue Service provides the following
immigration terms and definitions involving aliens:
1. Alien: An individual who is not a U.S. citizen or U.S. national.
2. Immigrant: An alien who has been granted the right by the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (hereinafter referred to as
the "USCIS") to reside permanently in the United States and to work
without restrictions in the United States.

21.

Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3.

16 WASH. & LEEJ.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 225 (2009)
3. Nonimmigrant: An alien who has been granted the right by the
USCIS to reside temporarily in the United States.
4. Illegal Alien: Also known as an "Undocumented Alien," is an alien
who has entered the United States illegally and is deportable if
apprehended or an alien who entered the United
States legally but who
22
has fallen "out of status" and is deportable.
As seen in the definitions listed above, the United States government
did not use the phrase "illegal immigrant" in any context. Courts and most
state legislatures generally do not use the phrase "illegal immigrant," and
instead either use the term "undocumented alien" or "illegal alien" when
referring to a person who has entered the United States illegally. 23 Please
note that if any study, court decision, or state or federal law uses the terms
"illegal immigrant" or "unauthorized immigrant," the source is referring to
illegal aliens. This Note focuses on state legislation designed to severally
punish the employment of illegal aliens. But, as will be seen in the case
law discussion below, a majority of the case law governing an alien's right
to employment concerned only aliens ("An individual who is not a U.S.
citizen or U.S. national" 24), not illegal aliens. This case law will be
nonetheless imperative to the focus of this Note because of its relevance in
assessing how recent laws affecting illegal aliens will be constitutionally
scrutinized.

II. Case Law
A majority of case law governing an illegal alien's right to
employment concerns only aliens. While these cases do not factually
involve illegal aliens, it is necessary to analyze these cases because the
legal rationales the courts use in upholding or rejecting state laws governing
aliens and their general rights to different types of employment may be
applied to state laws seeking to halt or greatly impede an illegal alien's
right to employment. The cases analyzed in subsection A comprise the
foundation of case law governing an alien's right to employment. The
cases analyzed in subsection B include modem case law governing an
illegal aliens' right to employment.
22.

Id.

23.

See Kris Kobach, Immigration Nullification: In-state Tuition and Lawmakers Who

Disregardthe Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 474-75 n.5 (explaining the usage of
different terms to describe "illegal alien" in immigration law today).
24. Id.
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A. FoundationalCases
The cases described below all concern state employment restrictions
placed on aliens, not illegal aliens. As will be evident below, state statutes
that discriminate based on alienage are subject to "strict judicial scrutiny,"
meaning that the state statute must be narrowly tailored and necessary to
promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest.25 Courts,
however, have never held that state laws based on illegal alienage are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. If recent state legislation that seeks to
impose harsh penalties on businesses employing illegal aliens, such as
Mississippi's Employment Protection Act, is rsubject to strict judicial
scrutiny, it will be a very difficult burden for Mississippi to meet. The
difficulty of a state satisfying strict judicial scrutiny with respect to laws
designed to curb the employment rights of aliens is evidenced in the cases
described below.
Graham v. Richardson was the first case establishing that state
classifications based on alienage were subject to strict judicial scrutiny.26
As noted above, in order for a state to meet this standard, the statute must
be narrowly tailored and necessary to promote a compelling or overriding
governmental interest.27 Graham concerned an Arizona statute that denied
welfare benefits to resident aliens unless they met a fifteen-year residency
requirement,28 and a Pennsylvania statute that denied welfare benefits to
resident aliens. 29 The only justification Arizona and Pennsylvania put forth
for their respective statutes was that each state had a "'special public
interest' in favoring [their] own citizens over aliens in the distribution of
limited resources such as welfare benefits." 30 In striking down both
statutes, the Court equated resident aliens to "persons" protected under the

25. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("Under strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications 'are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.'" (citing Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))).
26. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("But the Court's
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." (citations omitted)).
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 367 (describing the Arizona statute at issue in this case).
29. See id. at 368 (describing the Pennsylvania statute at issue in this case).
30. Id.at 372.

16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 225 (2009)
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3' While the Court
admitted that "a state ha[d] a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity
of its programs, 3 2 the Court rejected that a state may accomplish this
33
purpose by "invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument advanced by Arizona and
Pennsylvania that since no fundamental right was involved in the case,
strict judicial scrutiny should not apply. The Court instead concluded that
since alienage was a suspect class,34 a fundamental right need was not
necessary for strict scrutiny to apply.
The Supreme Court in In re Griffiths declared invalid a Connecticut
statute that excluded aliens from the practice of law.35 Connecticut
defended the statute's requirement that applicants for admission to the bar
be citizens of the United States on the ground that lawyers possessed a
"special role" within the state, and therefore excluding non-citizens from
this position was permissible.36 The State elaborated that in Connecticut,
"the maxim that a lawyer [was] an 'officer of the court' [was] given
concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a 'commissioner
of the Superior Court.' 3'7 Connecticut argued that a lawyer in the state had
powers that should only be conferred to a citizen, such as "authority to 'sign
writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and take
depositions and acknowledgements of deeds."' 38 The Court, however,
found these arguments advanced by Connecticut unconvincing: "It in no
way denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that the powers
'to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, (and) administer oaths'

31. See id.at 371 ("It has long been settled, and it is not disputed here, that the term
'person' in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of
the United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of
the State in which they reside.").
32. Id.at 374.
33. Id.at 375.
34. See id. at 376 ("The classifications involved in the instant cases, on the other hand,
are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny whether or not a
fundamental right is impaired.").
35. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) ("We hold that s[ection] 8(1) violates
the Equal Protection Clause.").
36. See id.at 723 (describing the Committee's defense for Rule 8(1)'s citizenship
requirement).
37. Id.
38. Id..
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hardly involve matters of state policy
or acts of such unique responsibility
39
as to entrust them only to citizens."
The Court in Sugarman v. Dougall carved out a limited exception that
in some circumstances, states could bar resident aliens from state or public
employment. 40 The test articulated in Sugarman for whether aliens could
be banned from a particular state position was substantially similar to basic
constitutional strict scrutiny, and looked to "the substantiality of the State's
interest in enforcing the statute in question, and to the narrowness of the
limits within which the discrimination is confined."' The Court recognized
a state interest in limiting participation in its government to those who were
"within 'the basic conception of a political community.' 42 The Court
applied this standard to a New York statute at issue in the case, which
denied all aliens the right to hold positions in New York's classified
competitive civil service, and held the law unconstitutional for violating the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause.43
Adopting a similar test as articulated in Sugarman,44 the Supreme
Court in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido concluded that a California statute, which
limited the position of a California probation officer to citizens, was not
unconstitutional. 45 The Court related the position of the probation officer to
state sovereignty, concluding that the probation officer "acts as an extension
of the judiciary's authority to set the conditions under which particular
individuals will lead their lives and of the executive's authority to coerce
obedience to those conditions."4 6 The Court used a dual perspective to
conclude that California's citizenship requirement was an "appropriate
limitation, 47 stating that from the perspective of the probationer, "his
39. Id.at 724.
40. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) ("We recognize a State's
interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that
government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community.'").
41. Id. at 642.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 646 (concluding that the New York statute at issue violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
44. See id.
at 642 (describing the Court's test for whether aliens could be banned from
a particular state position).
45. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982) ("Looking at the functions
of California probation officers, we conclude that they, like the state troopers involved in
Foley, sufficiently partake of the sovereign's power to exercise coercive force over the
individual that they may be limited to citizens.").
46. Id. at 447.
47. Id.at 744.
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probation officer may personify the State's sovereign powers; from the
perspective of the larger community, the probation officer may symbolize
the political community's control over, and thus responsibility4 8for, those
who have been found to have violated the norms of social order.
The court in Jii v. Rhodes held that an Ohio statute requiring
applicants for appointment to the office of notary public to be citizens of
the United States violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in absence of a showing that citizenship bore any relationship
to the special demands of the particular position of notaries public.4 9 Ohio
in this case argued that the statute falls under the "Sugarman-Cabell
'government function' exception" 50 because "notaries public exercise
'government functions' which were intimately related to the state's
sovereignty. "5' The court, writing on the assumption that the statute was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny
judicial analysis,52 still found the Ohio statute unconstitutional because the
court viewed notary publics closer in "quality and character to the functions
of an attorney, 5 3 which in In re Griffiths the Court held should be an
available position to resident aliens, 54 rather than to the functions of police
or probation officers.5 5 The court concluded that states may be justified in

48. Id.
49. See Jii v. Rhodes, 577 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (S.D. Ohio 1983) which states:
In this case, the state has utterly failed to demonstrate that citizenship bears any
relationship to the special demands of the particular position of notaries public.
Rather the defendants, without further explanation, simply state that the
citizenship requirement is needed because notaries perform sovereign functions.
Absent some further explanation, the Court is unconvinced that the citizenship
requirement for Ohio's notaries public is any way related to the achievement of
some valid state objective. The Court, therefore, concludes that the citizenship
requirement for notaries public found in R.C. 147.02 violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
50. Id.at 1133.
51. Id.
52. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973), for a discussion on the two
prongs needed to satisfy strict judicial scrutiny; a statute must be narrowly tailored (first
prong) and necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest (second
prong).
53. Jii, 577 F. Supp at 1134.
54. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) ("We hold that s[ection] 8(1) violates
the Equal Protection Clause.").
55. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982) (concluding that the
"functions of California probation officers" sufficiently "partake of the sovereign's power to
exercise coercive force over the individual that they may be limited to citizens").
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restricting aliens' access to certain offices,56 but maintained the Sugarman
standard that the position denied to aliens must require the "performance of
some functions regulation of which is necessary to preserve the basic
conception of a political community." 57
The five foundational cases analyzed above set a high standard for
states to overcome when enacting laws that discriminate against aliens with
respect to employment opportunities. As established in Graham, state8
classifications based on alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
The Court in Sugarman interpreted this test as examining "the substantiality
of the state's interest in enforcing the statute in question, and to the
narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is defined."5 9 The
only accepted state interest recognized by later courts and in Sugarman for
enacting a law that discriminates resident aliens from public employment
jobs is if the' position at issue is within "'the basic conception of a political
community. ,,60 In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, the Court held that the state

purpose in enacting a law that discriminated against non-citizens could be
compelling if the employment position at issue has a direct effect on the
functioning of government.6 ' Statutes, however, that discriminated against
aliens based on other factors were declared constitutionally void, as seen in
In re Griffiths and Jii v. Rhodes. It is thus very difficult for a state to
constitutionally discriminate against aliens for employment purposes.
As will be seen in Section B below, however, the Supreme Court has
not held that undocumented or illegal aliens are a suspect classification.
Thus, a state statute that denies benefits or imposes burdens on illegal aliens
56. See Jii v. Rhodes, 577 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding that a
state may have justification for restricting aliens' access to certain offices only if the position
meets the standard enunciated in Cabell).
57. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) ("We recognize a State's
interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that
government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community."').
58. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("But the Court's
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." (citations omitted)).
59. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642-43 (applying the strict scrutiny test to the statute at
issue).
60. Id. at 642.
61. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982) ("Looking at the functions
of California probation officers, we conclude that they, like the state troopers involved in
Foley, sufficiently partake of the sovereign's power to exercise coercive force over the
individual that they may be limited to citizens.").
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might be analyzed under the rational basis test 62 or under some type of
intermediate scrutiny, 63 as opposed to strict scrutiny as used in the cases
above regarding aliens. The constitutional test regarding the assessment of
a statute that discriminates based on illegal aliens remains to be seen.

B. Modern Case Law governing ConstitutionalRights of illegal Aliens
The three cases described below display the common constitutional
methods of attacking a statute that seeks to place restrictions on illegal
aliens. All three cases show that courts are still unwilling to determine that
state classifications based on illegal alienage are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny, or a mere rational basis or intermediate scrutiny test. The cases,
however, do provide insight into how state statutes designed to place severe
restrictions on illegal aliens are commonly attacked, and act as a guide as to
what arguments will likely work the best in the future.
1. Plyer v. Doe
The Court in Plyler v. Doe considered whether "Texas may deny to
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides
to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted
aliens." ' 4 The plaintiffs argued that Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in trying to deny to undocumented
children the right to free public education. 65 Texas, however, argued that
the Equal Protection Clause should not apply, stating that "the Equal
Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection only to persons
62. Under the rational basis test, the law (or other government action) will be upheld if
it is rationally related to any conceivable legitimate end of government. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Under our rational basis
standard of review, 'legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'"
(quoting Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, 457 U.S. 202, 440 (1982))).
63. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law (or other government action) will be upheld
only if it involves important government interests that are furthered by substantially related
means. See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570-571 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We
have denominated this standard 'intermediate scrutiny' and under it have inquired whether
the statutory classification is 'substantially related to an important governmental objective."'
(quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988))).
64. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (describing the main issue of the
case).
65. Id. at 206.
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within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase." 66 The
Court rejected Texas's argument, holding that both the Due Process Clauses
and Equal Protection Clause protect an identical class of persons.6 7 In
68
rejecting Texas's argument, the Court relied on Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
quoting that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorialjurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and
69 the protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.
The Court concluded that the Texas statute seeking to exclude illegal
alien children from the benefits of public education violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Texas failed to
show that the statute furthered any substantial state interest. 70 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court employed a type of intermediate judicial scrutiny,
only upholding the statute if it involved important government interests that
were furthered by substantially related means. 7' Applying intermediate
judicial scrutiny to these illegal alien children, however, is not a holding of
the case, and the type of judicial scrutiny that will be applied to illegal
aliens in the future still remains to be seen.

66. Id. at211.
67. See id. ("We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail
themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due
process.").
68. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not confined to the protection of only United States citizens).
69. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 212 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369, on the breadth of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. See id. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing
was made here.").
71. See id. at 217-18 ("[W]e have recognized that certain forms of legislative
classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by
inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.").
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2. Lozano v. City of Hazleton
A case that shed some light on how courts may respond when
confronted with a statute that discriminates through employment
restrictions against illegal aliens, as well as aliens, is Lozano v. City of
Hazleton.7 z The two statutes at issue in this case were both enacted by the
city of Hazleton on August 15, 2006 and on September 21, 2006 and were
titled respectively the "Tenant Registration Ordinance" (RO), and the
"Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance" (IIRA). 73 The RO required
apartment dwellers in Hazleton to prove through obtaining an occupancy
permit that they were citizens or lawful residents, 74 while the IIRA
"prohibits the employment and harboring of undocumented aliens in the
City of Hazleton. 7 5 The IIRA sought to address specifically the issue of
illegal aliens, defining an "illegal alien" as an "alien who is not lawfully
present in the United States. 7 6 The plaintiffs advanced three major
arguments against both of the statutes: that the IIRA and RO violate (1) the
Supremacy Clause, (2) the Due Process Clause and (3) the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.77 These three causes of action are
brought by plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,78 which in part
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in
79 an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress.
The court listed two criteria that must be met to establish a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983): "First the conduct complained of must
72. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
73. See id.at 484-85 (describing the statutes at issue in this case).
74. Id. at 484.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 485.
77. See id. ("The second amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that IIRA
and RO violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the United States.").
78. Civil Rights Act of1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
79. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (describing
how the plaintiffs first three causes of action are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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have been committed by a person acting under color of state law. Second,
the conduct must deprive the complainant of rights secured under the
Constitution or federal law." 80 The court concluded that no issue existed
whether the defendant, the City of Hazleton, acted under the color of state
law in enacting the ordinances at issue. 81 The court then addressed the four
82
major constitutional arguments advanced by the plaintiffs separately.
This Note will only analyze the constitutional arguments considered with
respect to the IRA, not the RO.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
federal law is the supreme law of the land. 83 Therefore, the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution "invalidates state laws that
'interfere with or are contrary to' federal law."' 4 The plaintiffs argue that
IRCA 85 contains a preemption clause that pre-empts the employer portions
of the IRA.86 The court agreed with the plaintiff's interpretation of the
IRCA by looking to the text of the IRCA preemption clause: "The
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens., 87
The court rejected the city of Hazleton's
80. Id. (citing Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590
(3d Cir. 1998)).
81. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 517 ("In the instant case, no question exists as to
whether the defendant acted under the color of state law in enacting the ordinances at
issue.").
82. See id. at 517-45 (outlining the four constitutional arguments as federal
preemption, procedural due process, equal protection, and privacy rights).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
84. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (describing the Supremacy Clause and its effect on
state law).
85. See IRCA, supra note 9, § 1324a(a)(1) ("It is unlawful for a person or other entity
to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing
the alien is an unauthorized alien ...with respect to such employment."). The Act further
imposed sanctions for any violations under section (a)(l). Id.("With respect to a violation
of subsection (a)(1)(A) or (a)(2), the order under this subsection shall require the person or
entity to cease and desist from such violations and to pay a civil penalty in an amount
of... ").
86. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 ("Plaintiffs assert that the federal Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986,... which deals with the employment of unauthorized
aliens, contains an express preemption clause that pre-empts the employer portions of the
lIRA.").
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2).
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interpretation of the provision that a "state or local municipality properly
can impose any rule they choose on employers with regard to hiring illegal
aliens as long as the sanction imposed is to force the employer out of
business by suspending its business permit. 8 8 The court found this
interpretation, "at odds with the plain language of the express preemption
provision. '' 9
The only two exceptions the court recognized with respect to the
IRCA preemption provision concerned (1) "[S]tate or local laws dealing
with 'suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license' to an entity
found to have violated the sanction provisions of the IRCA" 90 and (2)
"fitness to do business laws such as state farm labor contractor laws or
forestry laws." 91 The court found neither exception applicable to the IIRA
because as to the first exception, "Hazleton suspends the business permit of
those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate IRCA"; 92 and in
regard to the second exception, " [f]itness to do business laws generally
deal with a person's character as it relates to his or her ability to be engaged
in a certain business activity", which is not at issue in the IIRA.93 Finding
that neither of the two above described exceptions were applicable to the
IIRA, the court found that the IIRA's employment provisions violated the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.94
The court also found that the II1RA violated the due process rights of
both the employers and employees affected by the statute.95 The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. 9 6 Describing notice as the "cornerstone of due process," the Court
concluded that the IIRA "fails to require that anyone provide notice to an
employee when a complaint is filed or at any time during the

88.

Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (describing Hazleton's interpretation of the IRCA).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 520.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. ("Hazleton's ordinances are not fitness to do business laws such as state farm

labor contractor laws or forestry laws.").
94. See id. at 521 ("[W]e find that IRCA's express preemption provision applies to
IIRA's employment provisions. Thus, the Ordinance's employment provisions violate the

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.").
95. See id. at 537 ("For the above reasons, we find that IIRA violates the due process
rights of both the employers and employees and is thus unconstitutional.").
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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proceedings. 9' 7 Suggesting a possible outcome to this situation, the court
noted that an employer could "merely fire the employee and avoid the
hassle of determining the employee's immigration status." 98 Nothing in the
IIRA protected the employee from this hypothetical situation. 99
The third major argument the plaintiffs advanced in Lozano against the
IIRA was that the IIRA violated their equal protection rights.'00 The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a
state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'0 1 This constitutional argument, unlike the previous
two (Supremacy and Due Process), is not accepted by the Court because the
plaintiffs could not show that the "relevant decision-maker [City of
Hazleton] adopted the policy at issue 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'' 0 2 The Court used the
"because of," "in spite of' test because the IIRA is facially neutral, and
therefore a traditional rational basis or strict scrutiny test does not apply.' °3
The Court thereby never addressed whether illegal aliens were a suspect
class, and therefore entitled to strict scrutiny analysis for any statute
discriminating against them, or were not a suspect class and thereby only
entitled to a rational basis or intermediate scrutiny test. As noted at the end
of Section A, illegal aliens have still not been held as a suspect class by any
court.

97. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (describing why the IIRA violates the fundamental
notice principle of due process).
98. Id.
99. See id.("Nothing in IIRA provides protection to the employee from such action.").
100. See id. at 538 (claiming that the IIRA violates plaintiff's Equal Protection rights by
"allowing the City to consider race, ethnicity, or national origin in determining whether a
complaint under the Ordinance is 'valid'").
101. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V § 1.
102. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
103. See id. at 540, which describes how this approach requires a slightly different
analysis. The equal protection 'clause prohibits states from intentionally discriminating
between individuals on the basis of race. To prove intentional discrimination by a facially
neutral policy, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decision-maker (e.g., a state
legislature) adopted the policy at issue "because of,"' not merely "in spite of its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."
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3. Gray v. City of Valley Park
The Eighth Circuit in Gray v. City of Valley Park'04 held constitutional
an ordinance substantially similar to the statute at issue in Lozano, declaring
that the Supremacy Clause does not bar the ordinance because it was not
0
pre-empted by the IRCA.0'
The ordinance at issue in Gray made it
unlawful for any business within the City of Valley Park, MO, to "recruit,
hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or
instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or
part within the City.'0 ° 6 The ordinance penalized any business that violated

this section and failed to correct the violation within three business days
after notification
of the violation by suspension of the entity's business
7
license.

10

Similar to the court in Lozano, the court in Gray considered whether
the IRCA preemption clause pre-empts the city ordinance at issue. 0 8 The
IRCA preemption clause states that "the provisions of this section preempt
any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."' 0 9 The major
difference between the court in Lozano and Gray lies in each Court's
reading of the two exceptions ("other than through licensing and similar
laws") in the IRCA's preemption clause. The court in Lozano found neither
exception applicable to the IIRA because as to the first exception, Hazleton
suspends the business permit of those who violates its Ordinance, not those
who violate IRCA; 0 and as to the second exception, fitness to do business
laws generally deal with a person's character as it relates to his or her
ability to be engaged in a certain business activity, which is not at issue in
104.

Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 07-0088, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 (E.D. Mo.

Jan. 31, 2008).
105. See id. (describing the Immigration Reform and Control Act's preemption clause
and why the statute at issue falls under its licensing exception).
106. Id. at28.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 27 ("The first argument between the Parties relates to express
preemption; specifically, does the federal statute expressly preempt the state law in
question?"). The "federal statute" the Court is referring to is the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986.
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) (emphasis added).
110. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 520 (M.D. Pa- 2007) ("In the
instant case, Hazleton suspends the business permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not
those who violate IRCA.").
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the IIRA.I" The court in Gray, however, found that the licensing exception
of the IRCA did apply to the Valley Park ordinance because on its face the
ordinance at issue was a licensing law. 1 2 Most importantly, the court in
Gray did not read the licensing exception of the IRCA preemption clause 1to3
require that the IRCA must be violated in order for the exception to apply.
The court in Lozano, however, found that the licensing exception was not
applicable for this very reason; that Hazleton suspended the business permit
of those who violated the Hazleton Ordinance, not those who violated the
IRCA. 114 Thus it is in this minor difference in reading the exceptions to the
preemption clause in the IRCA that both courts reached opposing results.
While the court in Gray noted that the Lozano decision runs
completely contrary to their position," 5 the court nonetheless held that the
IRCA preemption clause exception applied, and therefore the Supremacy
Clause' 1 6 of the Constitution did not bar the Valley Park statute. 1 7 The
courts in Gray and Lozano created a clear split in analyzing statutes seeking
to halt employment of illegal aliens, but both decisions revealed that the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution are not
the only potential means to strike down such a statute. The Supremacy
Clause is at the forefront of the debate in both decisions, and will likely be
so in the future because of the potentially ambiguous text of the IRCA's
111. See id. ("Hazleton's ordinances are not fitness to do business laws such as state
farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws." (quotations omitted)).
112. See Gray v. City of Valley Park, 07-0088 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, 30-31
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (describing why the Valley Park ordinance falls under the licensing
exception in the IRCA).
113. See id. ("There is no requirement in the statute that a finding be made by the
federal government that a person has employed, recruited or referred for a fee for
employment, unauthorized aliens, only that those are the individuals who are subject to
penalty.").
114. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520 ("In the instant case, Hazleton suspends the
business permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate IRCA.").
115. See Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 at 32 n.13 ("Throughout their briefing,
Plaintiffs rely heavily upon the recent Pennsylvania decision, in which a substantially similar
local ordinance was found to be preempted by federal law. The Court respectfully notes that
the Pennsylvania decision is not binding, and therefore, the Court will conduct its own
thorough analysis of the issues presented." (citations omitted)).
116. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
117. See Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 at 37 ("The plain meaning of the statute
clearly provides for state and local governments to pass licensing laws which touch on the
subject of illegal immigration. The statute at issue is such a licensing law, and therefore is
not expressly preempted by the federal law.").
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preemption clause." 8 If the IRCA's preemption clause is read broadly as
displayed in Lozano, many recent state statutes designed to halt the
employment of illegal aliens will likely be held pre-empted by the IRCA,
thereby violating the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. If, however,
the preemption clause is read narrowly as seen in Gray, the recent state
statutes will likely not be held as violating the Supremacy Clause.
C. ConstitutionalFrameworkfor Assessing State ImmigrationEmployment
Statutes
The case law described above in Section A and in Section B have
several common themes prevalent throughout all of the cases that will help
in assessing recent state immigration employment legislation. The five
foundational cases described in Section A involve state employment
restrictions placed on aliens, all of which were subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. These cases display how difficult it is for a state to meet this
standard; notably only in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido did the Court uphold a
state's statute that discriminated against aliens.' 9 The test articulated in
Cabell established a high burden for a state to show a compelling interest,
and looked to see if the statute regulated an employment position (probation
officers in the Cabell case) which sufficiently partook of the "sovereign's
power to exercise coercive force over the individual that they may be
limited to citizens."' 120 Thus, if any of the recent state legislation imposes
restrictions on illegal aliens, as well as aliens, the statute will likely be
scrutinized with strict judicial scrutiny, and the burden on the state to prove
a compelling interest will be highly difficult to meet.
Even if the recent state immigration employment legislation only
involves illegal aliens, Equal Protection and Due Process challenges can be
made, as evidenced in Lozano v. City of Hazleton.12' Although strict
judicial scrutiny will likely not be applied, the State will still likely have to
meet the standards of either a rational basis or intermediate scrutiny test.
The Court in Plyer v. Doe rejected the argument advanced by Texas that
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2).
119. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982) ("Looking at the functions
of California probation officers, we conclude that they, like the state troopers involved in
Foley, sufficiently partake of the sovereign's power to exercise coercive force over the

individual that they may be limited to citizens.").
120. Id.
121.

Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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illegal aliens residing within the territory of the United States were not
covered by the Equal Protection Clause, 122 holding that illegal aliens in the
United States were "persons" within the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 Even though Plyler v. Doe did not concern employment
rights of illegal aliens (the case instead speaks to the right to public
education of illegal alien children), it established that illegal aliens residing
in the United States are entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection
clause. Therefore, any recent State immigration employment related
legislation can be attacked on both Equal Protection and Due Process
grounds regardless if the statue pertains to only illegal aliens, or aliens in
general.
Both Gray v. City of Valley Park and Lozano v. City of Hazleton
illustrate how the relation between the IRCA 124 and the Supremacy
Clause 125 is a major issue in cases involving state statutes designed to halt
the employment of illegal aliens. The relation between the Supremacy
Clause and the IRCA lies in the IRCA's preemption clause: "The
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens."' 126 Thus, depending on how a particular jurisdiction
reads this clause, recent state legislation seeking to punish businesses that
hire illegal aliens may be pre-empted by the IRCA's preemption clause. As
seen in both Lozano and Gray, no consensus across jurisdictions has been
reached on this preemption issue. In Section III below, the constitutional
framework described above will be applied to Mississippi's Employment
Protection
Act, which makes it a felony to knowingly employ illegal
127
aliens.
deny to any person within its
122. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § I ("No state shall ...
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
123. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982) (describing why illegal aliens residing
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protections afforded by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
124. Immigration Reform and Control Act, supra note 9.
125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2).
127. See Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supranote 3 ("It shall be a felony for
any person to accept or perform employment for compensation knowing or in reckless
disregard that the person is an unauthorized alien with respect to employment during the
period in which the unauthorized employment occurred.").
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Il.Analyzing the Constitutionalityof the Mississippi Employment
ProtectionAct
A. Standing
In challenging the constitutionality of the Mississippi Employment
Protection Act (the Mississippi Act or Act), a group of potential plaintiffs
must first prove standing pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983,28 which in part
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in
129an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
The court in Lozano v. City of Hazleton established that two main
criteria must be met to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: "First, the
conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under
color of state law. Second, the conduct must deprive the complainant of
rights secured under the Constitution or federal law." 30 A constitutional
challenge of the Mississippi Act can come either from an employer, who
has been found in violation of the Act's provisions, or an illegal alien(s)
that worked for an employer found in violation of the Act. Either of these
plaintiffs would satisfy both prongs of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because in either
case, the State agency or group of persons finding the violation and
enforcing the punishment would be acting under the color of state law, and
the State's conduct would deprive either the employer or illegal alien(s) of
rights secured under the Constitution or federal law. Whether the
deprivation of these rights is nonetheless constitutional will be the issue of
the case.

128.
129.
130.

Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
Id.
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (2007).

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OFMISSISSIPPI'S EMPLOYMENTACT

247

B. EqualProtectionand Due Process
The Mississippi Act pertains only to the employment of illegal or
unauthorized aliens, 3 ' therefore strict judicial scrutiny will unlikely be
applied in any constitutional challenge on due process or equal protection
grounds. A court instead will likely apply either a rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny test with respect to any due process or equal
protection challenge. The Mississippi Act provides that:
... when illegal immigrants have been sheltered and harbored in this
state and encouraged to reside in this state through the benefit of work
without verifying immigration status, these practices impede and
obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, undermine the
security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of Mississippi.
It is for these reasons that Mississippi declared that is a "compelling
public interest of this state to discourage illegal immigration."'133 In
equating the alleged problems with illegal aliens listed above as a
"compelling public interest," Mississippi seems to anticipate any challenge
based on equal protection or due process grounds. A state must only show
a "compelling interest" if strict judicial scrutiny 134 is applied. If, however,
only a rational basis 135 or intermediate scrutiny 136 test is applied, a state
must only show a legitimate or important interest. If a compelling interest
is shown, all three tests (rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny) will be satisfied.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that a State may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'137 A challenge brought pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause will probably fail for two primary reasons: strict scrutiny
131. See Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3, § 4(a) ("Employers in
the State of Mississippi shall only hire employees who are legal citizens of the United States
of America or are legal aliens.").
132. See id. § 71-11-1.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. To satisfy strict judicial scrutiny, a statute must be narrowly tailored (first prong)
and necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest (second prong).
135. Under the rational basis test, the law (or other government action) will be upheld if
it is rationally related to any conceivable legitimate end of government.
136. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law (or other government action) will be upheld
only if it involves important government interests that are furthered by substantially related
means.
137. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

248

16 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 225 (2009)

will likely not be applied 38 and any group of plaintiffs challenging the Act
will not be able to show that Mississippi adopted the Act "because of," not
merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 139 The
Mississippi Act does not contain any language that indicates that the State
adopted the Act because of its potential adverse affect on illegal aliens. 40
After analyzing the case law in Section B concerning employment
restrictions placed on illegal aliens, it is evident that courts have not struck
down such statutes on equal protection grounds.' 4' Due to this fact and the
reasons stated above, the Mississippi Act will likely not be struck down
based on the Equal Protection Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 42 The Mississippi Act will likely survive any procedural
due process challenge because the Act allows any employer or other person
penalized under the statute the right to appeal: "Any person or entity
penalized under this section shall have the right to appeal to the appropriate
43
entity bringing charges or to the circuit court of competent jurisdiction."
The Court in Lozano v. City of Hazleton struck down one of the statutes at
issue in the case partly because it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment for failure to provide notice. 44 The Mississippi
138. Strict scrutiny will likely not be applied because no court has ever held illegal
aliens as a suspect class. Therefore, Mississippi will only have to meet a lower standard of
either intermediate scrutiny or the rational basis test.
139. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("The
equal protection clause prohibits states from intentionally discriminating between
individuals on the basis of race. To prove intentional discrimination by a facially neutral
policy, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decision-maker... adopted the policy at issue
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
140. See generally Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3.
141. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (using intermediate scrutiny to
invalidate a Texas statute that sought to exclude illegal alien children from public education
because the state did not show the statute furthered a substantial state interest); Lozano, 496
F. Supp. 2d at 540 (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause argument that a local employment
statute was unconstitutional by employing a "because of," "in spite of' test because the
statute was facially neutral); Gray v. City of Valley Park, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, 37
(8th Cir. 2008) (holding the Immigration Reform and Control Act's preemption clause
exception applies and the Supremacy Clause does not bar the local employment statute).
142. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. See Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3 (describing the
opportunity to appeal when found in violation of the Act).
144. See Lozano 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (describing notice as the "cornerstone of due
process," the Court concludes that the ILRA "fails to require that anyone provide notice to an
employee when a complaint is filed or at any time during the proceedings").
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Act, however, provides such notice in giving a person or entity penalized by
the Act the opportunity to appeal the decision. 45 Any challenge based on
substantive due process will also fail because strict judicial scrutiny will not
apply, thereby making Mississippi's burden in showing that the statute
furthers some state interest substantially less.
C. Supremacy Clause
The Mississippi Act should be held constitutionally void because of
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and IRCA. The
Supremacy Clause provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 146 A state statute or government
regulation will be held in violation of the Supremacy Clause if it is preempted by a U.S. federal law or the U.S. Constitution. The Mississippi Act
is pre-empted by the IRCA's preemption clause because it fails to fall
within either of the two exceptions provided in the clause: "The provisions
of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ,147or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens."'

Two provisions in the Mississippi Act will be at issue in any
Supremacy Clause challenge. In the first provision that potentially violates
the Supremacy Clause, the Mississippi Act provides that:
Any employer violating the provisions of this section shall be subject to
the cancellation of any state or public contract, resulting in ineligibility
for any state or public contract for up to three (3) years, the loss of any
license, permit, certificate or other document granted to the employer by
any agency, department or government entity in the State of Mississippi
for the right to do business in Mississippi for up to one year, or both.'14
Mississippi will likely try to argue with respect to this provision that it
falls under the "licensing" exception of the IRCA's preemption clause.
This argument may be accepted depending on how broadly the relevant
jurisdiction reads the IRCA clause. The court in Lozano, for example, held
145.
146.
147.
148.

Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3, § (7)(e)(i).
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) (emphasis added).
Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
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that the IRCA's preemption clause licensing exception only applies if the
statute at issue revokes the license of a business due to a violation of the
JRCA, not the statute at issue.1 49 However, the court in Gray v. City of
Valley Park ruled that the licensing exception did apply to a statute
substantially similar to the one at issue in Lozano because the ordinance
revoked business licenses for violations of the ordinance, not the IRCA. 5°
Therefore, it will depend on the jurisdiction if the provision of the
Mississippi Act stated above will be held in violation of the IRCA's
preemption clause, and thereby in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.
The reason why, however, the Mississippi Act should be held
constitutionally void, regardless of jurisdiction, is that the second provision
at issue under a Supremacy Clause challenge. This provision of the Act in
part states:
It shall be a felony for any person to accept or perform employment for
compensation knowing or in reckless disregard that the person is an
unauthorized alien with respect to employment during the period which
the unauthorized employment occurred. Upon conviction, a violator
shall be subject to imprisonment in the custody of the Department of
Corrections for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, a
fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars $1,000.00) nor more than
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), or both.
This clause (hereinafter referred to the "felony and fine provision")
acts as a clear violation of the IRCA's preemption clause' 52 and does not fit
into either the "licensing" or "similar laws" exception. The above provision
in the Mississippi Act cannot in any way be read to reasonably relate to the
licensing or similar law exception, as it imposes imprisonment and fines for
violators of the Mississippi Act.153 Therefore, even if a jurisdiction adopts
149. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 520 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("In the
instant case, Hazleton suspends the business permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not
those who violate IRCA.").
150. See Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 07-0088, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) ("The plain meaning of the statute clearly provides for state and local
governments to pass licensing laws which touch on the subject of illegal immigration. The
statute at issue is such a licensing law, and therefore is not expressly preempted by the
federal law.").
151. Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens.").
153. Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supranote 3
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the view, similar to the one held in Gray v. City of Valley Park, that the
IRCA need not be violated for the licensing exception to apply, 54 a court
can still in no reasonable way hold that the felony and fine provision stated
above falls within one of the two exceptions contained within the IRCA
preemption clause. The felony and fine provision stated above goes far
beyond the bounds of the Valley Park ordinance held constitutional in Gray
v. City of Valley Park,'55 and any jurisdiction should find this provision, if
not the entire Mississippi Act, constitutionally repugnant.
The Mississippi Legislature in the Act attempts to anticipate any
preemption claim by providing that "[t]his section shall not be construed as
an attempt to pre-empt federal law" 156 immediately before the felony and
fine provision. This statement, however, should not be given weight by a
court because the felony and fine provision is a clear violation of the
IRCA's preemption clause.' 57 Thus, the entire Act or the felony and fine
provision should fail under constitutional scrutiny based upon the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Even though a court will likely not
find any equal protection or due process violation, cases such as Lozano
and Gray have shown how pivotal the Supremacy Clause and the IRCA can
be in deciding the constitutionality of a state statute designed to place
restrictions on the employment of illegal aliens. The Supremacy Clause
and the IRCA will be the best mode to attack similar statutes in the future.
IV. The Effect of Illegal Aliens on the United States Economy
Regardless of the constitutionality of recent State legislation designed
to halt the employment of illegal aliens, will this legislation likely help the
State's and the country's economy? The answer to this question will not be
clear at the end of this section, but the lack of a clear answer does not mean
that the recent State legislation is justified. To the contrary, the lack of a
dispositive answer to the question creates doubt in the rationales behind
154. See Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238 at 37 ("The plain meaning of the statute
clearly provides for state and local governments to pass licensing laws which touch on the
subject of illegal immigration. The statute at issue is such a licensing law, and therefore is
not expressly preempted by the federal law.").
155. Id.
156. Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3.
157. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized
aliens.").
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state statutes such as the Mississippi Act, and serves to question whether
states such as Mississippi acted both too quickly and harshly in enacting
these laws. This section will focus on contrasting studies analyzing the
effect of illegal aliens on the U.S. economy.
58

A. "The High Cost of Cheap Labor"

The "High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration and the Federal
Budget" is a study released by the Center of Immigration Studies" 9 (CIS) in
August of 2004. Claiming that the study was "one of the first to estimate
the total impact of illegal immigration on the federal budget,"' 6 the CIS
used Census Bureau data to support several major conclusions.'16 Most
significantly, the study asserted that "[h]ouseholds headed by illegal aliens
imposed more than $26.3 billion in costs on the federal government in 2002
and paid only $16 billion in taxes, creating a net fiscal deficit of almost
$10.4 billion, or $2,700 per illegal household. 1 62 Among the largest costs
of illegal aliens cited were "Medicaid ($2.5 billion); treatment for the
uninsured ($2.2 billion); food assistance programs such as food stamps,
WIC, and free school lunches ($1.9 billion); the federal prison and court
systems ($1.6 billion); and federal aid to schools ($1.4 billion)."' 163 The
study additionally estimates that if amnesty is granted for all illegal aliens,
the net fiscal deficit would grow to nearly $29 billion.'
Concluding that
the fiscal impact of illegal aliens at the federal level is almost certain to
"create a large fiscal deficit at the state and local levels,"' 65 this study casts
illegal aliens as a drain to the federal budget. The methodology employed
in this and other studies, however, were later questioned in the report
analyzed below.

158.
LABOR:

STEvEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. ON IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET

(2004), http://www.ilw.com/

articles/2004,0901 -Camarota.pdf.
159. Id.at 2 ("The Center for Immigration Studies, founded in 1985, is a non-profit,
non-partisan research organization in Washington, D.C., that examines and critiques the
impact of immigration on the United States. ").
160. Id.at3.
161. Id.
162. Id.(emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.at 38.
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B. "The Impact of UnauthorizedImmigrants on
the Budgets of State and
66
Local Governments
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in December of 2007 issued
a report entitled "The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets
of State and Local Governments."'167 This report questions the methodology
employed in previous studies finding that illegal aliens create a net fiscal
deficit in the federal budget. 168 The report further asserts that any impact
illegal aliens have on the federal economy should not be used to conclude
that illegal aliens have a similar impact at state or local levels.169 The
reason for this is because of "the type of services provided at each level of
government and the rules governing those programs."'170 For example,
illegal aliens are prohibited from receiving Social Security benefits from the
federal government, but state and local governments provide certain
services
to individuals, regardless of their immigration status or ability to
171
pay.
The CBO study relies on "29 reports published over the past 15 years
that attempted to evaluate the impact of unauthorized immigrants on the
budgets of state and local governments.' 7 2 After analyzing these sources,
the CBO provides several general conclusions that are common findings in
all or most of the 29 reports. One conclusion the CBO states is that "[t]he
amount that state and local governments spend on services for unauthorized
immigrants represents a small percentage of the total amount spent by those
173
governments to provide such services to residents in their jurisdictions.'
Additionally, most of the estimates examined by the CBO provided that
166.
IMPACT

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL

GovERNMENTs (2007), http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-fmigration.pdf.
167. Id.
168. Id.at I ("It is important to note... that currently available estimates have
significant limitations; therefore, using them to determine an aggregate effect across all
states would be difficult and prone to considerable error.").
169. Id. ("The impact of unauthorized immigrants on the federal budget differs from
that population's effect on state and local budgets primarily because of the types of services
provided at each level of government and the rules governing those programs.").
170. Id.
171. Id. (describing why any impact illegal aliens have on the federal economy cannot
be translated to state and local levels).
172. Id. at 2 (discussing how the CBO study was prepared and what methods were
used).
173. Id. at 3 (concluding that state and local governments spend a small percentage on
services for illegal aliens).
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illegal aliens "accounted for less than 5 percent of total state and local
spending for those services.' 74 The CBO, however, also concludes that
"[tihe tax revenues that unauthorized immigrants generate for state and
local governments do not offset the total cost of services provided to those
immigrants."' 175 Any 76precise estimate, though, on the amount of the deficit
is difficult to obtain.
Thus, in analyzing these past 29 studies, the CBO creates substantial
doubt as to the accuracy in any report analyzing the alleged deficit illegal
aliens create on state and local levels. Even though the CBO concludes that
most of the previous studies found that the tax revenues, which illegal
aliens generate for state and local governments, do not offset the total cost
of the services provided to those same people, the CBO also asserts that any
precise estimate is difficult to maintain. 177 The report further establishes
a
that any drain illegal aliens create on state or local programs accounts for 78
programs.
those
on
spent
amount
total
the
of
very small percentage
Finally, the report outwardly questions the methodology of reports
analyzing the effect of illegal aliens on the federal budget.

C. A Case Study
Angel Martinez is an illegal alien currently residing in the United
States. 79 Illegally crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in 1999, Mr.
Martinez has since "done backbreaking work, harvesting asparagus,
pruning grapevines and picking the ripe fruit. More recently, he has also
washed trucks, often working as much as 70 hours a week, earning $8.50 to
$12.75 an hour.' 80 In 2004, Mr. Martinez paid roughly $2,000 toward
Social Security and $450 for Medicare, but different than most other

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. ("The tax revenues that unauthorized immigrants generate for state and
local governments do not offset the total cost of services provided to those
immigrants... although it is difficult to obtain precise estimates of the net impact.").
178. See id. at 1 ("... spending by state and local governments on services specifically
provided to unauthorized immigrants makes up a small percentage of those governments'
total spending").
179. Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants are Bolstering Social Security With Billions,
N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2005.
180. Id.
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Americans, Mr. Martinez will not be entitled to the benefits.' 8' Mr.
Martinez is not the only illegal alien paying out money to programs such as
Social Security and Medicare without being able to receive any of the
benefits in the future. He "belongs to a big club."'' 82 This club is so big that
the estimated seven million or so illegal alien workers in the United States
are providing "the system with a subsidy of as much as $7 billion a
year."'83 While it has been evident that illegal aliens pay a variety of taxes,
their contribution to Social Security is overwhelming, growing to 10
percent of the federal surplus in 2004.184 Marcelo Suarez-Oroco, codirector of immigration studies at New York University, stated that illegal
aliens could provide
"the fastest way to shore up the long-term finances of
' 85
Social Security."'
While Mr. Martinez in no way proves that illegal aliens as a group
give more through taxes to the government than they receive back in federal
programs, his story showcases how the United States benefits substantially
from him and others alike in certain ways. It is impossible to know
precisely how many other illegal aliens pay their taxes like Mr. Martinez,
but "according to specialists, most of them do.' 86 Mr. Martinez's story and
the larger positive effect illegal aliens have on programs such as Social
Security instill doubt in the rationales used behind state laws seeking to
completely halt the employment of illegal aliens. Does Mr. Martinez and
millions of others like him act as a "compelling," or even legitimate interest
in denying them the opportunity to work?' 87
V Conclusion
Illegal aliens residing in the United States have not and likely will not
receive the same protections afforded to all other aliens. Illegal aliens do,
181. See id. (describing how much Mr. Martinez has paid to Social Security and
Medicare without the potential of receiving the future benefits from doing so).
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See id. ("The extent of their contributions to Social Security is striking: the money
added up to about 10 percent of last year's surplus-the difference between what the system
currently receives in payroll taxes and what it doles out in pension benefits.").
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Mississippi Employment Protection Act, supra note 3 ("The Legislature
declares that it is a compelling public interest of this state to discourage illegal
immigration.").
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however, have means to challenge recent state immigration employment
laws, especially those that impose harsh penalties on employers who
knowingly hire illegal aliens. The Mississippi Act serves as a prime
example of a state statute that goes far beyond the licensing exception in
IRCA preemption clause by making it a felony for an employer to hire an
illegal alien. This Act should be pre-empted by the IRCA and held
constitutionally repugnant due to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Illegal aliens may also have means to challenge state statutes based on the
Equal Protection or Due Process grounds if the statute will not further either
a legitimate or important government interest. Although courts have
generally not looked favorably upon such equal protection and due process
claims concerning illegal aliens, this outlook may change due to the lack of
clarity over whether illegal aliens really do have a negative effect on the
economy (federal or state). The illegal alien issue in the United States will
not be solved by state legislatures such as Mississippi. Such state action
only serves to perpetuate stereotypes, deprive businesses, and reduce seven
million Americans to a cost/benefit analysis. Until more clarity can be
reached on the effect illegal aliens have on the U.S. economy, states should
not enact laws with harsher punishments than the federal standard
established in the IRCA in 1986.

